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‘And Then He Switched off the Phone’: 
Mobile Phones, Participation and Political 
Accountability in South Sudan’s Western 
Equatoria State
Mareike Schomerus* and Anouk S. Rigterink*
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Introduction
In Western Equatoria State (WES), South 
Sudan, a chief of a payam (a cluster of vil-
lages) was reflecting on ways to connect to 
political and administrative leaders in case an 
issue arose. He owned a mobile phone and 
its credit had been topped up; he also knew 
the county commissioner’s mobile phone 
number. So when one of the villagers had 
told him about a security threat, the chief had 
called the commissioner to stress that the vil-
lage needed help. The phone call did not go 
as he had hoped. In fact, the call had left him 
deflated: 
I contacted the commissioner, to [ask 
him to] talk to the [military in the area]. 
I said to him…My [local protection mili-
tia] have no network [so I am asking 
you if] you can come with the soldiers 
* London School of Economics and Political 
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This paper uses qualitative and quantitative original data to investigate the impact 
of mobile phones in situations of political contestation or conflict. We derive 
hypotheses from theories in general political science, and on the role of mobile 
phones specifically. These suggest that a link exists between access to better 
communication structures, political participation and government accountability. 
Given such a link, information and communications technologies—specifically mobile 
phones—could play a positive role in building a more accountable government, 
and with that, contribute to statebuilding. We examine to what extent these 
hypotheses hold true for ordinary citizens in South Sudan's Western Equatoria 
State (WES). Using interdisciplinary methods, we use data gathered through 
in-depth interviews and a quantitative survey and find little evidence that mobile 
phone coverage contributes to statebuilding or peacebuilding through a causal link 
between information, voting, political participation and government accountability. 
In a situation where administrative structures and mechanisms do not exist for 
citizens to hold politicians accountable, access to mobile phones might mean 
greater dissatisfaction with political participation and voting. People living in 
areas without coverage expressed a deep mistrust of government, and appeared to 
want to withdraw from the system of government entirely.
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and help. He said, “ok, we’ll see” and 
then he switched off the phone.1
The chief never heard back from the commis-
sioner on the issue and when the chief tried 
ringing again, the call was not answered. 
Being able to directly call a person with polit-
ical authority, it turned out, had meant very 
little. In fact, for the chief it was a poignant 
reminder that despite an existing communi-
cation structure he was not able to effectively 
communicate with higher authorities—nor 
did the authorities seem much inclined 
to engage with him. Having a device that 
allowed him to communicate had done noth-
ing to help with his real security problem. 
This realisation came as a surprise to 
him—and also goes against much of the 
existing optimism about the political power 
of mobile phones (Wasserman 2011). From 
political theory, we could establish a ‘causal 
chain’ connecting access to communication 
infrastructure with better informed citi-
zens, which in turn increases participation, 
which makes for more accountable govern-
ment. This assumes, broadly speaking, that 
a communication infrastructure improves 
communication and the level of information 
amongst citizens, particularly in situations 
of political contestation or conflict. Better 
informed citizens, various theories predict, 
participate more frequently politically, spe-
cifically by voting but also by contacting 
political figures directly. This in turn, could 
lead to more accountable government, and 
with that, contribute to statebuilding. 
To what extent do these links hold true for 
ordinary citizens in South Sudan’s Western 
Equatoria State particularly regarding the role 
of mobile phones? We examine the impact 
of having access to a mobile phone network 
to investigate this. Are individuals living in 
areas with mobile phone coverage more 
likely to feel well-informed, to hold political 
and administrative leaders to account, and to 
vote with a sense of being able to influence 
political change? We answer these questions 
using interdisciplinary methods, and analyze 
data gathered through in-depth interviews 
and a quantitative survey.
It emerges that in this case, better mobile 
phone coverage does not improve govern-
ance and does not lead to increased political 
participation. Instead we find that in a situ-
ation where administrative structures and 
mechanisms do not exist to hold politicians 
to account, access to mobile phones might 
be associated with greater voicing of dissat-
isfaction with political participation. Further, 
when it comes to voting, access to mobile 
phones may decrease political participation. 
People living in areas with mobile phone 
coverage were more openly frustrated with 
the experience and long-term outcomes of 
the elections, and were less likely to say they 
plan to vote in the future, compared to those 
living in areas without coverage. Similarly, 
those living in areas with coverage high-
lighted the irresponsiveness and particular 
grievances with government and local politi-
cal and administrative leaders, but they were 
more likely to state that they had brought an 
issue or complaint to specific leaders in the 
preceding year. Those living in areas without 
coverage expressed a deep mistrust of gov-
ernment, and appeared to want to withdraw 
from the system of government entirely. 
Thus in WES there is little evidence that 
mobile phone coverage contributes to state-
building or peacebuilding through a causal 
link between information, voting, political 
participation and accountability of govern-
ment. Although having access to a mobile 
phone network may indeed mean that peo-
ple feel better informed, this sense of being 
better informed does not appear to translate 
into more participation in, or more satis-
faction with, the voting process. Although 
access to a mobile phone network may facili-
tate people calling government figures to 
account directly, contributing to trust in gov-
ernment, it should be understood that over-
all trust in and satisfaction with government 
is extremely low.
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: the first section provides background 
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on South Sudan and Western Equatoria State. 
The second section presents our hypotheses 
on mobile phone coverage and three out-
comes: information, political participation 
and political accountability. The third section 
explains our method. Sections four through 
six present results on the three respective 
outcomes from qualitative and qualitative 
analysis. The final section concludes.
Background
Western Equatoria State
WES occupies South Sudan’s southwest-
ern corner. The area is extremely fertile but 
suffers from severe underdevelopment: 
passable roads are almost non-existent, as 
are reliable schools and health services for 
large parts of the population. The informa-
tion infrastructure is limited; radio is by 
far the most common source of informa-
tion although reception across the state is 
patchy. When asked what their communities 
need, respondents in open-ended interviews 
tended to list infrastructure requirements 
with an emphasis on health and education, 
closely followed by the need for roads and 
clean water. Yet they also often mentioned 
the need for a good mobile phone network, 
or preferably several mobile phone network 
providers to avoid outages. The lack of a good 
network is clearly a source of frustration, as 
is the cost of airtime and inability to afford 
a handset. In remote areas, owning a mobile 
phone is beyond reach for most people. 
South Sudan became independent in 2011, 
after a referendum on self-determination that 
had been provided for in the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement negotiated between the 
Government of Sudan and the rebels of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). 
The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM)—the political wing that emerged 
from the SPLA—is the dominant political 
party. Before the referendum, in which only 
Southerners were allowed to vote, elections 
were held throughout all of Sudan in 2010. 
Although international criticism of these elec-
tions was subdued, they were considered as 
problematic (Willis 2011). Sudan, and now 
South Sudan, have been the focus of intense 
international engagement; often this engage-
ment has focused on building peace and 
improving governance (d’Errico et al. 2014). 
These have been challenging endeavours in 
South Sudan, with the applicability of com-
monly deployed notions of peace- and state-
building questioned (Lacher 2012; Schomerus 
and Allen 2010; Young 2012). Of crucial rel-
evance to this paper is the often-repeated 
notion that infrastructure—communication 
infrastructure tends to be specifically men-
tioned—has a part to play in building South 
Sudan’s peace, linking communities and facil-
itating political processes that help prevent 
violence (Jok 2014; Jok 2012).
Bordering the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) and the Central African 
Republic (CAR), WES has experienced lit-
tle direct fighting during Sudan’s civil wars. 
Yet it has been heavily affected by repercus-
sions of war through displacement of people 
from WES or people into WES and commu-
nal violence. More recently, Uganda’s Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) had a settled presence 
near WES from 2005 to late 2008 (Schomerus 
2007). Particularly in 2008 and 2009, the 
LRA also committed violence against civilians 
in WES, with more sporadic incidents in the 
following years. A military operation against 
the LRA involving international troops has 
maintained a high sense of insecurity and 
militarization (Gordon et al. 2007; Atkinson 
2009; Schomerus and Tumutegyereize 2009; 
Schomerus 2012; Schomerus and De Vries 
2014; Rigterink et al. 2014). The question 
of the positive role of mobile phones in 
increasing political accountability has to be 
seen particularly in connection to the for-
mer presence of the LRA. One of the local 
population’s grievances against the central 
government is the lack of protection that 
government troops provided against the LRA; 
in fact, government reactions to what was at 
the time a very real security threat were seen 
as deliberately subdued (Schomerus and De 
Vries 2014). Some negative attitudes towards 
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mobile phones that we encountered need to 
be seen in this context: A few respondents 
argued that people with bad intentions—i.e. 
planning to attack—used phones to commu-
nicate and coordinate their actions, thus also 
making life more dangerous.
The link between the population in WES 
and the central government in Juba is at 
best tenuous, and more realistically, virtually 
non-existent. Elections were held in 2010 for 
the then southern Sudan assembly, during 
which people in WES elected representatives. 
However, an often-heard complaint is that 
the thus elected representatives—regardless 
of whether they shared the same ethnic-
ity—had left the area and had not visited 
again since they had been elected and now 
could not be contacted. Having a parliamen-
tarian of one’s own ethnicity thus did not 
strengthen a feeling of being represented; 
strong support for the reinstatement of the 
areas as a kingdom overseen by the Zande 
King is also fed by this sentiment (Schomerus 
2014 ). A further often-repeated grievance 
is the government’s lack of action towards 
improving the local infrastructure, thus fail-
ing to establish a sense that South Sudan is 
on a path towards peace and change.
Local political and administrative figures 
include those at boma (village) and payam 
(cluster of villages) level. At both levels, there 
is usually a chief and an administrator. The 
former is commonly considered to be a gov-
ernment, and the latter a ‘traditional,’ leader, 
although chiefs are an official part of the 
government and at least in theory receive a 
government salary. The individuals who fill 
these four positions are usually well known 
in their areas, so people could conceiv-
ably talk to them directly without the use of 
mobile phones. 
Theory, Literature and Hypotheses
This paper investigates a number of hypoth-
eses about the role of mobile phones in 
spreading information, encouraging political 
participation and facilitating accountabil-
ity of politicians. These stem from theoreti-
cal and empirical literature. First, and most 
obviously, mobile phones are thought to 
facilitate the spread of information. This has 
been investigated most thoroughly for the 
economic arena: better information on prices 
of goods and waiting times at markets could 
enable markets to operate more efficiently 
(e.g. Abraham 2006). Empirically, mobile 
phones have been found to enable farmers 
(Aker 2010) or fishermen and women (Jensen 
2007) to find a market faster for their pro-
duce and to establish where they can get the 
best price. The role of mobile phones in the 
political sphere has received less attention, 
although some authors suggest that in the 
African context mobile phones help to spread 
political information and help build networks, 
both of which are seen to break down hierar-
chies (Wasserman 2011). In some cases mobile 
phones are thought to contribute to rapid 
awareness of particular concerns (e.g. SARS 
in China). Information received via mobile 
phones might be perceived as particularly 
trustworthy because the sender of the infor-
mation is known (Hermanns 2008). Therefore, 
the first hypothesis we investigate is: 
H1.1: Availability of a mobile phone signal 
is associated with higher (perceived) quality 
of information individuals have about non-
personal matters. 
Increased availability of information is, in 
turn, thought to be related to political partic-
ipation. Although political participation can 
take many forms, including attending politi-
cal rallies, campaigning for a political candi-
date or signing a petition, we focus on one of 
the most consolidated measures in political 
science: voting. This might seem a very nar-
row measure of participation; however, in 
combining quantitative and qualitative data 
on voting we are able to contextualise this 
measure for WES, where the meaning of vot-
ing is not necessarily that of an individual 
expression of an opinion.
Theoretical models suggest that more 
informed citizens are more likely to vote. 
Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) use game 
theory to detail how uninformed voters 
abstain to maximize the probability that 
the ‘swing voter’ will be an informed voter. 
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Matsusaka (1995) arrives at the a similar pre-
diction using a rational choice model, sug-
gesting that a rational voter derives greater 
utility from the act of voting if he/she is 
more confident in his/her choice (Matsusaka 
1995). Sobbrio (Forthcoming) reviews numer-
ous empirical studies that indeed show that 
information is related to voter turnout. Aker, 
Collier and Vicente (2013) specifically study 
the case of mobile phones in Mozambique. 
They conclude that an intervention sending 
individuals text messages containing infor-
mation about upcoming elections made 
the election process more transparent and 
increased voter turnout (Aker et al. 2013). 
This suggests a second hypothesis: 
H2.1: Availability of a mobile phone signal 
is associated with a higher probability that eli-
gible individuals have voted or will vote.
Greater voter participation is one way to 
hold political leaders accountable. However, 
mobile phones may also facilitate account-
ability directly by providing people with the 
information needed and/or the means to 
contact political or administrative leaders 
with their concerns. This could translate into 
greater satisfaction with the response of the 
political leader. This link has not been exten-
sively investigated for mobile phones, espe-
cially in the context of a developing country, 
although enthusiasm for the possibilities 
is great. Rotberg and Aker, for example, 
claim that ‘mobile phones are revolution-
izing politics and driving political change 
throughout the developing world’ (Rotberg 
and Aker 2013). Such passion is not always 
shared and skepticism about the sweeping 
effect of mobile phones on political devel-
opment has also been voiced (Alozie et al. 
2011). However, there is ample evidence that 
consumption of information via ‘traditional’ 
media (newspapers and television) and via 
the internet is related to political involve-
ment in the US context (see Campbell and 
Kwak 2010 for an overview). It is also com-
monly found that information improves 
accountability (Pande 2011). Furthermore, 
Campbell and Kwak (2010) find that those 
who use their mobile phone more are more 
likely to engage in specific forms of political 
engagement, including contacting a public 
official or a political party, in the context of 
the US.
The act of exercising ‘voice’ in itself may 
increase trust in and satisfaction with a 
political leader. This supposition is sup-
ported by theoretical work (Bos et al. 1998) 
and empirical studies in a laboratory setting 
(Cremer and Tyler 2007). The latter authors, 
for example, set up an experiment in which 
a leader makes decisions for a group of sub-
jects. They find that subjects who are given 
the opportunity to voice their opinion are 
more satisfied with the leader’s decision 
and judge the leader to be more trustworthy 
than subjects without ‘voice,’ even though 
the actual decision taken is the same for 
both groups. Again, empirical evidence 
outside a laboratory setting, let alone in a 
developing country, is rare. However, Bailard 
(2009) finds evidence for a link between 
mobile phones and perceived account-
ability: increased availability of cell phone 
towers across Africa, and in Namibia spe-
cifically, is associated with decreasing levels 
of perceived corruption. Other research on 
mobile phones, specifically for South Sudan, 
has included the importance of mobile 
phones in collecting data (Demombynes 
et al. 2013). Furthermore, findings from 
Tanzania suggest that better data—collected 
through mobile phones—can increase public 
accountability; a crucial finding, however, is 
that simply making data publicly available 
is not sufficient for increased accountability 
(Croke et al. 2013).
This gives us our final set of hypotheses: 
H3.1: Availability of a mobile phone signal 
is associated with a higher probability that an 
individual has contacted a political or admin-
istrative leader directly.
H3.2: Availability of a mobile phone signal 
is associated with greater satisfaction with the 
response of political or administrative leaders 
when contacted.
H3.3: Availability of a mobile phone signal 
is associated with greater trust in political and 
administrative leaders.
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Methods
The paper utilizes interdisciplinary meth-
ods, using empirical data consisting of semi-
structured interviews and group meetings 
(referred to as qualitative data), and a survey 
of individuals (referred to as quantitative 
data). The two authors carried out both types 
of research in roughly the same geographic 
areas (see Table 1) over the same two-month 
research period.
Sample and questionnaire design
The quantitative survey of individuals covers 
Ezo County and the two southern-most pay-
ams of Tambura County. We randomly sam-
pled seven bomas in Ezo and three bomas in 
Tambura. Within these bomas, households 
were randomly selected from a list of all 
households in the village drawn up by the 
village headmen. Within the sampled house-
holds, the respondent to the survey was ran-
domly selected from a list of individuals over 
18 years living in the household, drawn up in 
collaboration with the household head. The 
total sample consists of 433 respondents, 
an estimated 4.3 per cent of the total adult 
population in sampled villages. 
The survey questionnaire included ques-
tions on basic demographics; willingness to 
contribute to public goods; attitudes towards 
various political leaders and the central gov-
ernment; perceptions of security; and access 
to information and its perceived quality. The 
authors designed the questionnaire with 
substantial input from four South Sudanese 
researchers. All questionnaires were admin-
istered in Pazande by enumerators living in 
Ezo and Tambura Counties. A native Pazande 
speaker translated the original English ques-
tionnaire; accuracy of the translation was 
checked during a workshop with the enu-
merators and during various small pilots in 
the region. More information on the survey 
can be found in the survey report (Rigterink 
et al. 2014).
We conducted a total of 70 qualitative 
interviews during two visits, in December of 
2012 and in April and May of 2013, not all of 
which are directly referred to in this paper. 
Interviews took place in seven out of the ten 
villages covered by the survey; three villages 
are only covered by qualitative interviews. 
We selected interviewees because they hold a 
position of authority—for example as a chief, 
administrator, spiritual leader—because they 
represent a particular group—such as dis-
placed persons, women, people affected by 
illness—or because we encountered them 
in day-to-day interactions. Often, interviews 
were done in a community meeting setting, 
with dozens of people gathering generally 
for several hours. We conducted interviews 
in English, the local language Pazande and 
French. A translator translated interviews in 
Pazande on the spot. In the qualitative inter-
views, we asked no direct questions about 
how people viewed the usefulness of mobile 
phones for political participation. Rather, 
we asked separately about the importance 
of mobile phones and about the reality of 
political participation and accountability. In 
some instances, these themes came up with-
out prompting.
Operationalization of concepts
Mobile phone coverage
Mobile phone coverage was observed first-
hand during the visits of the survey team. 
This team visited each village for a minimum 
of three days. We distinguish between three 
categories:
1. ‘No coverage’ if there is no mobile 
phone network at any time or location 
in the village. In the analysis of the 
quantitative data, this is the omitted 
category. 
2. ‘General coverage’ if the network in 
the village is good enough to make a 
call in a substantial part of the village 
(usually along the main road). In the 
quantitative analysis this is a dummy 
variable equaling one.
3. ‘Sporadic coverage’ if phone cover-
age is present in the village at one 
or two select points. For example, it 
is not unusual for people to know or 
mark particular locations (e.g. a small 
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hill) with coverage. In the quantita-
tive analysis this is a dummy variable 
equaling one.
Out of the ten villages surveyed, three were 
classified as having general coverage, another 
three villages as having sporadic coverage, 
and four villages had no coverage at all. An 
overview of villages covered in the survey 
and by the interviews respectively, and their 
level of mobile phone coverage, can be found 
in Table 1.
Both of our measures of mobile phone 
coverage are correlated to household phone 
ownership as measured by the survey (cor-
relations are significant at the 0.01 per 
cent level). The average number of phones 
per household ranges from 0.39 to 0.52 in 
villages with general coverage, from 0.16 to 
0.27 in villages with sporadic coverage and 
from 0.02 to 0.18 in villages without cov-
erage. Overall, approximately one third (a 
weighted 31.2 per cent) of the households 
surveyed owned at least one mobile phone. 
We did not explicitly ask respondents for the 
type of mobile phone owned, i.e. whether it 
was one with only basic functionality (calling, 
texting), a feature phone (having basic mul-
timedia and internet capability) or a smart 
phone. Hence, it is possible that respondents 
own a phone capable of accessing informa-
tion via the internet. However, 3G internet 
connectivity was extremely poor through-
out the research area when research was 
conducted our team was not able to access 
the internet in any of the research locations. 
Boma Level of mobile 
phone coverage
County Covered in 
quantitative 
survey?
Type of qualitative interview
A Sporadic Ezo YES none
B General Ezo YES Two-hour community meeting with 40 par-
ticipants (women, men, youth)
C Sporadic Tambura YES Community meetings with women, Arrow 
Boys, Youth, refugees from the Central 
African Republic, general community meet-
ing with about 200 participants 
D None Ezo YES Community meeting with 50 participants
E General Ezo YES Three interviews with chief, elders
F Sporadic Tambura YES Three interviews with residents, interview 
with group of young men
G General Tambura YES Interview with chief and elders
H None Ezo YES Three interviews with elders, women, and 
Arrow Boys
I None Ezo YES none
J None Ezo YES none
K General Tambura NO 9 interviews with spiritual leaders, women, 
people affected by illness, individuals
L General Ezo NO 16 interviews with individuals, government 
administrators, chiefs
M General Tambura NO 11 interviews with chief, youth, women’s 
association, government administrators, 
individuals
Table 1: Overview of villages covered in quantitative survey and qualitative interviews.
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Furthermore, it is possible that respondents 
use their phones to receive a radio signal. 
However, mobile phone coverage and radio 
coverage do not appear to be positively cor-
related; the correlation coefficient between 
an indicator for general coverage and the 
quality of the reception of the main radio sta-
tion broadcasting in Pazande (Yambio FM) is 
negative. In qualitative interviews, the use of 
mobile phones to connect to the internet or 
the radio was not mentioned. Hence, we con-
sider it most likely that any impact of mobile 
phones observed is due to people using their 
phone for calling or texting purposes.
Quality of information
We take people’s perception of how well 
informed they are as an indicator for the 
quality of information. In the survey, this is 
measured by the extent to which they agreed 
or disagreed with a series of statements, on a 
four-point scale (strongly disagree, disagree, 
agree, strongly agree). These statements 
were: ‘I have good information about what 
happens in (a) my community; (b) WES; (c) 
CAR and DRC; (d) Juba and South Sudan; (e) 
the rest of the world.’ 
Political participation: voting
As highlighted earlier, we take voting as 
one indicator for political participation. 
Respondents were asked whether they had 
voted in the national elections in 2010 and 
in the referendum on the independence of 
South Sudan in 2011. They were also asked 
whether they were planning to vote in the 
next national elections. We did not specify 
when these would take place, as this was 
uncertain at the time. Answers were recorded 
on a dichotomous (yes-no) scale. 
Accountability: trust, direct contact and 
satisfaction with response
We employ a number of indicators of politi-
cal accountability, in line with the hypoth-
eses presented: contacting a political or 
administrative leader directly, satisfaction 
with the response of that leader and trust 
in the leader. We focus on four local leaders: 
the boma administrator, boma chief, payam 
administrator and payam chief. Respondents 
were asked how often they trusted each 
leader and indicated their answer on a four-
point scale (never, rarely, sometimes, always). 
The second indicator is a dummy variable 
equaling one if the respondent reports that 
he/she has brought an issue or concern in 
front of each leader respectively in the last 
12 months. Lastly, we asked respondents who 
had brought an issue or concern in front of a 
leader to what extent they were satisfied with 
that leader’s response. We capture strong 
dissatisfaction through the description ‘the 
leader did not help, did not treat the respond-
ent fairly or listen at all’ while moderate dis-
satisfaction was captured by the answers ‘the 
leader helped, treated the respondent fairly 
or listened a bit’ (but not fully). Respondents 
who stated that ‘the leader helped a lot, 
treated the respondent completely fairly and 
listened fully’ were considered to be satisfied 
with the leaders’ response. 
Control variables
All quantitative analyses include basic demo-
graphic control variables: the age of the 
respondent, years of education completed, 
and three indicators for household wealth 
(number of chickens, goats and bicycles 
owned). Because the latter variables are 
measured at the household level, we also 
include the number of children and adults in 
the household. 
Furthermore, in all analyses we control for 
village-specific characteristics related to both 
the placement of cell phone towers and indi-
vidual political participation. Of particular 
concern is the degree of isolation. A study 
investigating factors related to the place-
ment of cell-phone towers concludes that 
population size, income, distance to a main 
road, travel time to the nearest city, eleva-
tion and ruggedness are the major determin-
ing factors (Buys et al. 2009). Therefore we 
include the following as control variables 
in all regressions: number of households in 
the village, a dummy variable for whether 
the village is situated on the main road, the 
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straight-line distance to Yambio (the state 
capital) and the capitals of both counties 
under investigation, and village level aver-
age household ownership of chickens and 
goats. Elevation differences in the area under 
research are minor, and therefore not likely 
to be of importance. Despite these attempts 
to hold as many intervening variables as pos-
sible constant, we cannot exclude the possi-
bility that other factors exist that drive both 
cell phone tower placement and individual 
outcomes, biasing our analysis. However, 
our area of research is relatively small and 
isolated overall, with a diameter of less than 
125 kilometers as the crow flies, and all vil-
lages are more than two days travel by car 
away from the South Sudanese capital Juba. 
Hence, all villages included in the analysis 
could be considered isolated. 
Analysis
Quantitative data was analysed using regres-
sion analysis, employing ordered logit 
regression in the case of an ordinal depend-
ent variable (quality of information, trust) 
and logit regression for binary dependent 
variables (voting, satisfaction with response, 
contacting leaders). Similar results were 
obtained using (ordered) probit regression 
(not shown). Our explanatory variable of 
interest is village-level mobile phone cover-
age. Standard errors are clustered at the vil-
lage level. 
Since our research strategy aims to draw 
conclusions on the effect of mobile phones 
by comparing individuals living in villages 
with different levels of mobile phone cover-
age, ideally these villages are similar across 
other, intervening aspects. About this, we 
note the following. First, we recognize that 
ethnicity plays an important, often contro-
versial role in South Sudanese politics. The 
population within our area of research is 
fairly ethnically homogenous: taking mother 
tongue as an indicator of ethnicity, 92.5 per 
cent of the respondents to the survey iden-
tified themselves as Azande. Second, we use 
village-level mobile phone coverage, rather 
than individual mobile phone ownership, 
as our main explanatory variable of interest. 
Individual mobile phone ownership is plau-
sibly related to individual characteristics, 
such as wealth, education and inclination to 
travel outside the village; these characteris-
tics are in turn likely related to our depend-
ent variables of interest. Since proximity 
of a cell phone tower determines mobile 
phone coverage, this is less subject to such 
biases. In addition, all analyses presented 
control for household asset ownership as an 
indicator of wealth and individual level of 
education. Third, as highlighted above, we 
control for a number of village-level factors 
known to determine the placement of cell-
phone towers. 
Qualitative interviews were coded using 
MAXQDA. Interviews were organized accord-
ing to the three categories of mobile phone 
coverage. Within the interviews, we coded 
text that mentioned (a) quality of infor-
mation; (b) voting or elections; or (c) ways 
of connecting or holding to account cen-
tral government or local leaders. We then 
mapped out the coded text, first looking for 
patterns in each separate location. Finally, 
we compared how these patterns differed 
across the three categories of mobile phone 
coverage. Where interviews quoted directly 
have been lightly edited for clarity, this is 
indicated by square brackets.
Mobile Phones and Information
We examined if people who live in villages 
with mobile phone coverage indeed feel 
better informed—this corresponds to our 
hypothesis 1.1. Table 2 shows the results of 
an ordered logit regression with perceived 
quality of information as a dependent vari-
able and two levels of mobile phone cover-
age as explanatory variables in addition to a 
full set of control variables. 
A number of interesting patterns emerge 
from the quantitative data. Looking at Table 
2, mobile phone coverage is indeed posi-
tively related to how well informed individ-
uals perceive themselves to be. Coefficients 
obtained on phone coverage are positive 
and strongly significant. Judging by the size 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
‘I have good infor-
mation on what 
happens in…’
Community Western 
Equatoria 
State
CAR and DRC Juba and 
South Sudan
The rest of 
the world
ologit ologit ologit ologit ologit
General phone cover 8.191*** 12.26*** -3.888*** 15.15*** 16.45***
(1.345) (1.747) (0.626) (1.701) (2.164)
Sporadic phone cover 6.082*** 9.105*** -0.896** 10.08*** 11.33***
(1.087) (1.314) (0.443) (1.185) (1.378)
Gender 0.104 0.275 0.387 0.279 0.0536
(0.245) (0.316) (0.273) (0.267) (0.295)
Age -0.00399 -0.0154 -0.00265 -0.00739 0.00227
(0.00588) (0.0109) (0.0105) (0.00809) (0.0100)
Education 0.0637 0.0118 -0.00176 -0.00597 -0.00902
(0.0396) (0.0421) (0.0336) (0.0347) (0.0414)
# adults in household -0.135 0.0269 -0.0146 0.165* 0.132***
(0.108) (0.128) (0.133) (0.0864) (0.0446)
# children in 
household
0.0978 -0.0177 0.0392 -0.0391 -0.0614*
(0.0661) (0.0798) (0.0400) (0.0288) (0.0369)
# chickens hh owns 0.00977 0.00133 -0.00141 -0.0119 -0.00971
(0.00764) (0.00749) (0.00658) (0.00829) (0.00639)
# goats hh owns -0.0139 -0.0197 -0.0202 -0.0150 0.00567
(0.0132) (0.0146) (0.0172) (0.00976) (0.00706)
# bicycles hh owns -0.153 0.191* 0.312** 0.259* 0.171**
(0.137) (0.109) (0.123) (0.134) (0.0773)
Village hh population -0.0223*** -0.0289*** 0.00916*** -0.0367*** -0.0423***
(0.00352) (0.00424) (0.00157) (0.00413) (0.00555)
Village on main road 1.811*** 2.352*** -1.451*** 2.720*** 2.917***
(0.362) (0.357) (0.293) (0.369) (0.362)
Distance to Yambio 40.58*** 51.09*** -15.52*** 61.54*** 69.63***
(6.719) (7.833) (2.823) (7.110) (8.968)
Distance to Ezo 19.59*** 23.63*** -8.354*** 30.49*** 34.82***
(3.100) (3.722) (1.405) (3.555) (4.662)
Distance to Tambura 35.57*** 49.37*** -9.043*** 55.16*** 62.24***
(6.428) (7.580) (2.570) (6.459) (7.753)
Avg. # goats owned in -3.737*** -4.608*** 2.516*** -6.721*** -6.760***
Village (0.623) (0.775) (0.301) (0.758) (0.986)
Avg. # chicken owned -0.703*** -0.816*** 0.143** -0.958*** -1.110***
in village (0.107) (0.125) (0.0599) (0.110) (0.164)
Observations 423 418 391 396 379
Pseudo-R2 
(McFadden)
0.0488 0.0892 0.0726 0.0951 0.0903
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 2: Mobile phone coverage and perceived quality of information.
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of the coefficients, this effect is stronger for 
those villages with general phone coverage, 
but also applies when phone coverage is 
only sporadic. These results are obtained for 
all five types of information, with the excep-
tion of information on what is happening 
in the CAR and DRC. In addition to mobile 
phone coverage, perceived levels of infor-
mation are mainly associated with village-
level variables. 
Individual characteristics such as gender, 
age, education and ownership of most assets 
are not significantly related to how well 
informed someone feels. An exception is the 
number of bicycles owned by the household; 
those individuals living in a household with 
more bicycles feel better informed, plausibly 
because these individuals can travel more 
easily. Looking at the village-level variables, 
it appears that information is perceived to 
be better in villages on the main road, as 
expected. However, the other village-level 
control variables have unexpected signs. 
People in more populous villages feel less 
well informed, people in villages far away 
from the larger towns of Yambio, Ezo or 
Tambura feel better informed, and people 
in villages richer in terms of goats and chick-
ens owned feel less well informed. Thus, 
the assumption that people living in larger, 
richer or less remote population centers per-
ceive themselves to be better informed does 
not hold true. 
The qualitative data tells a similar, if some-
what more nuanced, story: While broadly 
speaking people in areas with general cover-
age acknowledge their lack of information, 
they see this as a shortcoming of the struc-
tures in which they find themselves. In stark 
contrast is a common sentiment in areas 
with no coverage: here lack of information 
seems to create active distrust and the belief 
that the government withholds information 
on purpose. We thus find that people with 
general coverage tend to assess their situa-
tion in a more nuanced and less disillusioned 
way, even if they do not feel that their access 
to information is adequate.
Information in Areas with General Coverage
In the areas with general coverage in which 
we conducted both the survey and qualita-
tive interviews, mobile phone networks 
were seen as a useful source of information. 
Further, respondents also in areas with gen-
eral coverage but where we did not gather 
quantitative data specifically mentioned 
their lack of information on particular top-
ics; they did not feel that the quality of 
information on security issues, for example, 
was good. Often respondents’ answers were 
framed around a lack of access to informa-
tion. In a payam centre close to the border, 
respondents talked about feeling discon-
nected from what was going on in the county 
centre and what was being decided regarding 
resource distribution, deployment of mili-
tary forces or development projects pursued. 
They expressed their ignorance about some 
of the broader rules that applied elsewhere 
in the country, stating specifically that this 
was due to not having the information deliv-
ered to them in an accessible way: ‘There is 
no one coming from the government telling 
us what the law is.’2 Respondents saw sources 
of information as deficient; this was true for 
government administrators who felt relying 
on word of mouth was not good enough for 
them. In a village close to the county head-
quarters, respondents stressed their lack of 
information of what was happening on the 
state level: ‘We have limited ideas about 
issues to do with Yambio, we are only aware 
of what is happening in our own boma.’3
Thus, even in areas with general coverage, 
people did not necessarily feel well informed. 
In a more remote small town near the CAR 
border (with general coverage), one woman 
explained that being at the border meant 
that other women in the county centre did 
not realise that in the villages they also had 
a women’s association and were in need of 
resources. Being able theoretically to com-
municate across the distance seemed to do 
little to alleviate the sense of being discon-
nected.4 In an area with very good road con-
nections—conditions that imply that access 
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to information is good—one respondent 
linked his lack of information directly to his 
status as being a powerless individual in the 
government and personal hierarchy.5
Information in Areas with Sporadic or No 
Coverage
Some of the areas with no coverage are 
extremely remote, described quite aptly by 
one respondent from a village near the bor-
der as ‘They have no other source of informa-
tion apart from their neighbours in DRC.’6 
In such areas, people spoke about their lack 
of information in a more conspiratorial way, 
i.e. as if there was a specific policy of secrecy 
behind it. Because people could see planes 
passing overhead—which might be passen-
ger planes, World Food Programme planes, 
or military aircraft—they were deeply sus-
picious about the reasons for the air traf-
fic: ‘And what is beating our understanding 
is all the planes flying into the bush. What 
are they looking for? Planes you cannot rec-
ognise if they are [South Sudanese army] or 
[Ugandan army], that is also why we don’t 
trust our government.’7
These feelings seemed exacerbated by the 
fact that few government representatives ever 
visited, thus both person-to-person commu-
nication, as well as phone communication, 
were non-existent: ‘Apart from [the] chief no 
one has come to see us since [the] LRA first 
attacked. Despite the fact that we lost people 
[who were killed] and people are [still] miss-
ing, nobody has come to say condolences. 
Neither the MP, neither the payam admin-
istrator, paramount chief, nor [the] commis-
sioner.’8 Thus, another common theme was 
the lack of continuous connection to outsid-
ers or representatives of authority. From this 
also emerged a concern about the one-sid-
edness of information sharing. The sporadic 
nature of outside engagement—including of 
government officials—was a common reason 
for distrust.
Respondents in interviews repeatedly 
made the point that they had no way of 
checking whether the information they 
were providing was being used correctly, i.e. 
without distortion of what they had said. As 
one person summed it up: ‘Now I am keeping 
quiet because I have not seen any good come 
out of giving information.’9 Further, this dis-
trust in the one-sidedness of information 
also seemed to stem from the perception or 
experience that the government was treating 
information casually: ‘So [people asking us 
questions] can change the information just 
like the government is doing.’10
In areas with sporadic coverage, respond-
ents were often categorical in their nega-
tive assessment of the usefulness of phones. 
Rather than acknowledging that they had 
some access to mobile phone networks, 
respondents stressed that there was only 
one network (requesting that other provid-
ers would come in). Further, they argued 
that there was no contact between them 
and other communities because they had no 
mode of communicating. At times, respond-
ents categorically stated—incorrectly—that a 
phone network was not at all available.11 In 
an area with no coverage, a group of elders 
highlighted that this deficit increased their 
vulnerability. They gave two reasons: lack of 
network meant they could not communicate 
problems to their payam headquarters and 
because information and warnings could not 
reach them.12
Mobile Phones and Voting
We have previously established that individu-
als living in areas with mobile phone cover-
age feel better informed or have a nuanced 
view of their information situation; but cru-
cially, this access to information does not cre-
ate a sense of holding much power. Does the 
feeling of being better informed translate 
into a higher probability that they will vote 
(hypothesis 2.1), especially if people feel dis-
empowered? Overall, voter participation in 
WES is very high. The (weighted) percentage 
of people who voted in the 2010 elections 
and the 2011 referendum on independence 
is 88.3 per cent and 92.2 per cent, respec-
tively, and 80.8 per cent of respondents plan 
to vote in the next national elections. This 
limited variation leads to lack of convergence 
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when estimating the logit regression, and 
coefficients and standard errors reported 
should be considered less accurate than 
those normally obtained.
Nevertheless, Table 3 presents the results 
of a logit regression taking voting as a 
dependent variable, and phone coverage 
and a full set of controls (coefficients omit-
ted for brevity) as explanatory variables. The 
results appear to suggest that, in contradic-
tion to the hypothesis proposed, village 
mobile phone coverage is negatively associ-
ated with the probability that inhabitants of 
that village will vote or will have voted. The 
only exception is the relationship between 
sporadic phone coverage and intention to 
vote in the next elections. Overall, however, 
it would appear that those people living in 
villages with mobile phone coverage are less 
likely to say that they have voted in the pre-
vious election, or will vote in the next elec-
tion. The qualitative interviews suggest a 
possible reason behind this: the more access 
to a mobile phone network people had, the 
more nuanced they were in their description 
of the voting experience and their assess-
ment of the exercise as futile. What was 
striking about the remarks on voting and the 
outcome of elections across all sites was an 
absence of the language of empowerment: 
respondents did not talk about their elec-
toral participation as an act of being a politi-
cally responsible citizen and being able to 
influence actions of their elected representa-
tives. Being better informed meant that peo-
ple were in fact more skeptical, particularly 
when it came to the usefulness of voting. 
This result contradicts hypothesis 2.1, which 
is based on theories and empirical research 
that better informed people tend to be more 
inclined to vote. Alzouma (Forthcoming), 
makes a similar point: it is not clear that just 
because a particular technology is available, 
people will use this technology to partici-
pate in democratic processes. This holds true 
especially when respondents perceived these 
processes to be flawed. 
Voting and Areas of General Coverage
In areas with general mobile phone cover-
age, a striking pattern emerged when people 
spoke about how they viewed elections. A 
number of respondents reflected on the bruis-
ing experience of elections in WES: ‘There 
were two candidates, but there were reports 
that they burnt the ballot papers, [there was] 
fighting, [and] arrest[ing] people. That made 
me feel not so good.’13 Others recounted 
their personal experience of being put under 
pressure during the elections. A member of 
(1) (2) (3)
DEPENDENT:
Voted / plans to vote in… 2010 elections 2011 referendum Next national elections
logit logit logit
General phone cover -20.92*** -18.88*** -8.044***
(3.022) (2.914) (2.026)
Sporadic phone cover -22.59*** -22.46*** 21.50***
(0.470) (0.647) (0.467)
Constant 118.73 102.21 -91.76
Observations 429 426 405
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) 0.3264 0.2466 0.3023
Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. All control variables are included; coef-
ficients are omitted for brevity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 3: Mobile phone coverage and voting.
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Jehova’s Witnesses—a group that was publicly 
shamed and had their Kingdom Hall burned 
down when they attempted to act according 
to their faith and not vote in the referendum—
recounted how he and his fellow members 
had to pretend they were voting, but in reality 
spoiled their ballot deliberately: ‘At the time 
they said [that] those who did not vote for 
the referendum, they are guilty. We thought 
something may happen to people [who didn’t 
vote], but it did not… The government reaction 
was not good. [The government] was telling 
everyone to vote.’14
Others remembered how the elections 
divided people, particularly if candidates 
sought support along ethnic lines: ‘Before 
people were living in harmony, but politi-
cal issues have divided [them]. Politicians 
want to secure their position, so they come 
and divide people. During elections, some 
people here vote for Nagero [a neighbour-
ing county] and those in Nagero voted for 
Tambura [county]. They convinced people 
[by] paying people. If you hear people talk 
about conflict between Balanda [who pri-
marily live in Nagero] and Tambura, that is 
the root cause.’15
One respondent, who passionately 
defended his ‘right to vote, to choose leaders 
whom [he] want[s] …to contest’ and his right 
to have his ‘voice to be heard by the govern-
ment’, outlined why the elections had not 
managed to grant him these rights. Instead, 
he emphasised that during elections, actual 
choice was curtailed by emphasis on voting 
only for the SPLM and lack of understanding: 
‘The star was [the] emblem of the SPLM. But 
beside[s] the star, nobody know[s] who [else] 
is there. The citizens were not taught how to 
vote. There was no rally; people were sup-
posed to be sensitised what it means to vote. 
So it was a mess.’16 Another person related 
the troubling experience of the elections to 
the desire to appoint, rather than elect, a 
king for the Azande: ‘There will be no elec-
tions. This [appointing, rather than electing] 
is the part of our culture we want to keep. 
[But, p]art of the government is saying this 
king should be elected, so this is where con-
flict comes.’17
A chief recounted how he had felt that the 
elections had been manipulative: ‘At times 
these politicians use people, at times my MP 
can even use me to let me deceive my peo-
ple to stay in power. That is what we don’t 
want.’18 Or, as another respondent put it, cre-
ating a stark contrast between presumably 
a less-than-credible election and a genuine 
election: ‘The governor was elected but… the 
king will be chosen by the people.’19
Lack of credibility of the electoral pro-
cess—including the assumed built-in 
accountability procedures—was also cited 
by a group of young men in a county head-
quarter with general coverage. They partic-
ularly emphasised how disappointed they 
had been with the conduct of their elected 
representatives: 
A good leader should advocate for his 
people. Other leaders here were just 
elected but they don’t know how to 
do that work. You need to talk with 
other people because if elections 
come you can even be reelected. But 
here it does not happen. People get 
elected; they consume, and they just 
remain there…Elections were [a] good 
idea because if the people we elect are 
not doing well, it will be a lesson to 
us. Next time I think we need to elect 
a good leader. We will know who is a 
good leader through qualifications…I 
don’t know if the government [will 
make] rule[s] for the next election. 
Are you really qualified for that post? 
Some of [the candidates] are not qual-
ified, they don’t even know how to 
talk with [the] public. Some MPs they 
just go and sit; they have nothing to 
say about their constituents. But they 
get money for sitting [there]. But last 
election people who ran for office 
were told “‘if you can read, you can 
write.”’ That is what is going to keep 
us poor until we die.20
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Voting and Areas of Sporadic or No 
Coverage
In areas with sporadic or no coverage, com-
ments on the elections were sparse; the few 
comments we received lacked the nuance 
of precise reasoning why the elections had 
been so troublesome. Markedly, the focus 
here was less on the process of elections 
and rather on the disappointing behaviour 
of elected individual officials or their fail-
ure to achieve improvements. One striking 
comment—which also expresses the hostility 
felt towards the government—was made in a 
community meeting in an area with sporadic 
coverage. Respondents explained ‘we elected 
this person but since we elected him, he 
has not come back, so we think he has been 
bought by the government. But we raise our 
voice from here, wrote to payam administra-
tor that we need by-elections because the 
guy has never [come] back.’21 In areas with no 
mobile phone coverage, we heard no com-
ments on the electoral process as such, but 
disillusionment with the outcomes was pal-
pable—particularly the lack of engagement 
of the elected officials was noted.22
Areas without coverage tend to be par-
ticularly vulnerable and exposed to possible 
attacks. Thus respondents had more tightly 
connected voting for a representative with 
having those problems solved. One said ‘It 
was said that people will vote for people 
who can take their problem ahead.’23 In one 
area with no coverage, it was particularly 
noted that the former governor had to be 
voted out of office because she had publicly 
denied that there even was a security prob-
lem: ‘It was good that she was not re-elected. 
Otherwise we would all be dead.’24
Mobile Phones and (Direct) Political 
Accountability
Listening to how people describe their own 
capacity to hold politicians to account, we 
find a similar pattern as we did when talk-
ing about voting: In areas with general 
coverage respondents’ description of their 
expectations and disappointments was a lot 
more precise than in areas without cover-
age. Across the sites there seemed to be lit-
tle difference in how empowered people felt 
towards being able to hold their leaders to 
account. The quantitative findings, outlined 
further below, shed light on the generalis-
ability of these findings. 
(Direct) Accountability in Areas with 
General Coverage
It seems as if the general availability of a 
network—even an unreliable one—had no 
influence on the feeling of being able to con-
nect to authorities. Rather, contact to higher 
authorities was seen as having to be medi-
ated through a hierarchical chain. The people 
in the chain and how they behave was much 
more important than the handset and the 
network that allows connecting to them. This 
is in line with Asiedu (2012) and the African 
Research Institute (2011) findings about 
the importance of humans over technology 
(Bhalla 2011; Asiedu 2012). In areas with gen-
eral coverage, respondents often expressed 
mistrust of government and its functional-
ity in precise ways. One respondent with a 
prominent position within the community 
stressed how closely citizens were observing 
their leaders: ‘People look for leaders who 
[are] concerned about the welfare of the peo-
ple. To trust someone, you will see what he 
does. How do [they] behave towards people 
and towards [themselves]?’25 One respondent 
remarked on the lack of stability that the gov-
ernment brought: ‘Government is like a wing. 
Tomorrow, tomorrow next, it can change.’26 
Criticism of political leaders was clear but 
also specific. A group of youth in a town cen-
tre—with regular and reliable mobile phone 
access, although this location was not cov-
ered by our survey—pointed out that they had 
not experienced their leaders to be account-
able: ‘A leader is not even accountable to 
the citizens. As a leader in parliament, you 
have to come to the people and account for 
them, not [by giving] money, but give them 
information…[They] also need to give hon-
est account[s] of [their] failure[s]., Right now 
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there is no information on what is working 
and why it is not working.’27 One woman in 
an area with general coverage, which was not 
covered by our survey, argued for the need 
for transparency: ‘If I [were] the president I 
would call all the governors, commissioners, 
[and] community leaders so that they [could] 
discuss how decisions are made.’28
In areas with general coverage, the tone 
seemed to be stronger when people talked 
about government failures and unfulfilled 
expectations. Respondents noted the gov-
ernment’s passivity: ‘The Government stood 
[by] and watched and listened’29 and ‘in the 
national government, nobody was acting. So 
people were wondering: is something being 
planned for the entire community? So we 
had to find a way of surviving.’30 Specific 
examples of government inactivity or lack of 
accountability were given: ‘Why has the road 
not been fixed? [We] requested several times 
from Yambio, but they said it’s in the pipe-
line.’31 Respondents seemed to keep close 
tabs on perceived or real unfulfilled promises, 
for example, ‘last year the governor promised 
a tailor shelter and a tea seller restaurant. Up 
to now these are not yet completed.’32
When put in a situation of having to deal 
with the government, the tone in which 
respondents described these interactions 
tended to be more assertive and self-confi-
dent than in areas with no coverage. Clear 
lines were drawn between government reach 
and local authority: ‘The very issue is we 
want to maintain our cultures and norms; 
we cannot fully do that with the govern-
ment.’33 There was a clear sense of stronger 
local political organization which would help 
to stand up against unpopular government 
decisions: ‘Outside town the land is solely 
under the community[’s control]. If the gov-
ernment is to invest they have to ask the com-
munity. From the community, the chief is the 
key person. Also, the community participates 
in associations: women[’s] association[s] and 
youth association[s].’34
However, it was notable that only in areas 
with general coverage did people mention 
the possibility of holding their leaders to 
account and of initiating change in this way.35 
One young man stressed how the youth—
after having received training from an inter-
national NGO on how to be closer to the 
government—‘challenged the government, 
because the government does not want 
the citizens to know what they are doing.’36 
People at least described their attempts to 
bring a concern to the attention of the local 
political and administrative leaders in various 
ways—even though none of them expressed 
a strong sense of empowerment or a belief 
that the upward chain of accountability was 
working: ‘People ask many questions to gov-
ernment officials.’37
However, there are accounts of an account-
ability chain working: ‘During elections there 
was tension between the former [and the 
current] governor. The [former governor won 
the vote in this county] and then [the peo-
ple here] complained that the new governor 
was not coming [to visit this area after he had 
won the statewide vote]. So, he came and he 
listened to them.’38
(Direct) Accountability in Areas with 
Sporadic or No Coverage
In areas with sporadic coverage, the pattern 
also suggested that people had a sense of 
what the government ought to be doing, but 
that implementation of the duties was not 
happening. One man recounted how for-
eign soldiers had killed his brother. He was 
aware that the government ought to help 
him in receiving compensation from the 
perpetrator: ‘The law also says if somebody 
is killed you have to pay a fine, but there is 
nobody from the government to pursue it.’39 
Another example was a realisation by a wom-
en’s group that they ought to have received 
money from the government—by way of the 
former governor who is now a national min-
ister—but even though ‘she sent some money 
… the money does not reach [us].’40
In these areas, respondents seemed mostly 
resigned to the fact that the quality of their life 
depended on the government’s whim. They 
expressed that the government was using its 
citizens as pawns for other purposes as one 
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respondent explained: ‘[The] Government is 
just using people [like a] business…One rea-
son for me is that [government exaggerates] 
the amount of insecurity so government can 
then call on [the] UN for money to eat the 
money [for themselves].’ So the government 
is just making more insecurity, to get more 
money from the UN.’41 An older man said: ‘If 
it was possible we could all go to CAR, if there 
was peace in CAR, and let the government 
see what they can do with an empty place. 
Because right now the government is only 
there because [we] the people are there.’42
In areas with no mobile coverage, people 
often spoke about the government’s active 
interest in seeing them perish, and that the 
government was deliberately avoiding engag-
ing with people on the local level: ‘They are not 
interested in our corners,’43 and, ‘Why is [the] 
government forgetting one part of the coun-
try? And in which country is there no road to 
where the citizens are [living]? What kind of 
government is that?’44 One strong statement 
was: ‘What [the] government is doing is deny-
ing our rights.’45 The starkest expression of 
this sentiment of deliberate neglect was: ‘The 
government wants to kill us.’46
Many with this attitude remarked on the 
benefits of being further delinked from the 
national government by strengthening local 
structures and problem-solving. One group 
said: ‘We don’t know why [the] government 
could not come and help, but we cannot wait 
for it.’47 The importantce of local actors’ impor-
tance was stressed: ‘Nobody is helping apart 
from [the] chief; the only government looking 
after us is [our] chief.’48 Particularly when it 
came to civilian protection and the failures of 
the national and international armies, people 
argued for local structures: ‘Why bring more 
soldiers if they don’t protect us? If they bring 
more they can even kill us. So we can protect 
ourselves, our boys are there.’49
While explaining the importance of local 
protection militias for the community, a 
group argued: ‘We are not against the gov-
ernment. We are not turning against the gov-
ernment. But government is only protecting 
itself, and we are protecting ourselves. Our 
boys are very important to the community, 
but we are only protecting [ourselves], we are 
not turning against the government.’50
However, other groups felt more directly 
neglected by the government: ‘All [the] chiefs 
called for a meeting and advised youth that 
they needed to defend themselves otherwise 
they were all going to die, and [the] govern-
ment was not coming to help them.’51 In 
areas with no coverage, expectations of [the] 
government were very low indeed—rang-
ing from ‘the government is not making the 
right decisions because those in power are 
against our people,’,52 to ‘people are always 
complaining that the government is neglect-
ing us and not giving [us] any information. 
It is true; there is nothing here to show the 
presence of the government.’53
Qualitative data thus shows that the dis-
satisfaction with the accountability of gov-
ernment is high overall. Results also suggest 
that people in areas with general coverage or 
sporadic coverage are more likely to mention 
specific instances when they felt that govern-
ment officials wronged them; in some cases 
respondents said they had attempted to hold 
government officials to account directly, 
though this usually did not have a direct 
result. People in areas with no coverage, by 
contrast, expressed a blanket distrust of the 
government, to the point of saying that the 
government actively meant them harm, and 
seem to have completely withdrawn from 
the official political system. Udo-Udo Jacob 
and Akpan (Forthcoming), observe a similar 
dynamic in Nigeria. Focus group participants 
who have been cut off from mobile phone 
signals for counter-insurgency reasons indi-
cate that they were ‘no longer part of Nigeria,’ 
reflecting a similar sense of withdrawal from 
the national political system. They also note 
that it is not uncommon for people to blame 
the federal government and the president for 
the mobile phone blackout (which was, in 
fact, a military decision) and for a wide range 
of other misfortunes.
Quantitative data broadly confirms the 
findings from the qualitative analysis. First, 
we look at trust (hypothesis 3.3). A logit 
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regression, with trust in various leaders as 
the dependent variable and mobile phone 
coverage and control variables as an explana-
tory variables (Table 4, panel A – coefficients 
on control variables omitted), suggests that 
people in areas with mobile phone coverage 
are indeed more likely to express trust in a 
number of local leaders. These include the 
payam and boma administrators. We found 
no effect for the payam chief. Overall, there 
seems to be less mistrust of political and 
administrative leaders in areas with mobile 
phone coverage, echoing results obtained 
from qualitative data. This result extends to 
the national government; individuals in areas 
with mobile phone cover express a greater 
sense of satisfaction with the performance of 
the national government in Juba (column 5).
Results shown in Table 4, panel B also con-
firm that people in areas with mobile phone 
coverage are more likely to have attempted 
to hold a political or administrative leader 
to account directly (hypothesis 3.1). They are 
more likely to report that they have brought 
an issue or concern to the payam adminis-
trator and the boma chief in the past year. 
Counterintuitively, results suggest a negative 
relationship between mobile phone coverage 
and reporting to the payam chief. However, 
overall, we find evidence that people living in 
areas with mobile phone coverage are indeed 
less likely to have withdrawn from political 
processes altogether.
Qualitative evidence suggests that although 
people in areas with mobile phone cover-
age leave open the option to contact a local 
leader directly, this does not imply satisfac-
tion with the leader’s response (hypothesis 
3.2). Again, this is confirmed in the quantita-
tive data. Panel C of Table 4 explores the level 
of dissatisfaction with the response of the 
leader expressed by individuals living in areas 
with different levels of mobile phone cover-
age, controlling for incidence of reporting 
an issue or concern. It suggests that people 
living in areas with mobile phone coverage 
are significantly less likely to express strong 
dissatisfaction with any leader’s response 
(column 10), but significantly more likely to 
express moderate dissatisfaction (column 11), 
compared to individuals living in areas with-
out coverage. This holds for both sporadic 
and general coverage. Mobile phone coverage 
thus does not appear to have unidirectional 
impact on the overall level of dissatisfaction. 
Conclusion
We investigated whether various hypotheses 
about the role of information and commu-
nication technologies (specifically mobile 
phones) in statebuilding and peacebuilding 
hold true in Western Equatoria State, South 
Sudan. ICTs, and mobile phones in particular, 
could serve to inform citizens better, making 
them more likely to vote, and improve politi-
cal accountability. Keeping in mind meth-
odological caveats outlined in the methods 
section, we find evidence that living in an area 
with mobile phone coverage is indeed related 
to an increased perceived quality of informa-
tion. Mobile phones thus do seem to play a 
role in spreading information. However, this 
does not necessarily translate into political 
participation in the form of voting. People 
living in areas with mobile phone coverage 
express greater disillusionment with the vot-
ing process and are less likely to say that they 
have voted or will vote in the future; their 
skepticism is very clear. Hence, our research 
suggests that mobile phones do not contrib-
ute to political accountability through the 
ballot box—leaving aside uncertainty about if 
and when next elections will be held. A degree 
of direct accountability exists since people 
living in areas with mobile phone coverage 
allow for the possibility to complain to local 
political and administrative leaders directly, 
and they are more likely to have done so in 
the past year. However, this does not necessar-
ily mean that leaders act on these complaints; 
regardless of mobile phone coverage, people 
appear unsatisfied with the response they 
receive. People in areas with coverage score 
most political and administrative leaders 
higher on trustworthiness. Qualitative data, 
however, reveals that overall levels of trust 
are extremely low. A main difference between 
areas with and without phone coverage is that 
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Robust (clustered) standard errors in parentheses. All control variables are included; coef-
ficients are omitted for brevity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Mobile phone coverage and (direct) political accountability.
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Trust in… Payam 
Administrator
Payam Chief Boma 
Administrator
Boma Chief Satisfaction 
Juba 
government
ologit ologit Ologit ologit ologit
General phone cover 2.834** 1.814** 1.920 9.449*** 13.74***
(1.160) (0.902) (1.362) (0.839) (1.509)
Sporadic phone 
cover
1.814** 0.919 1.225 5.690*** 8.833***
(0.835) (0.627) (0.875) (0.555) (1.129)
Observations 425 428 415 430 396
Pseudo-R2 
(McFadden)
0.1242 0.1094 0.1187 0.1346 0.0862
PANEL B (6) (7) (8) (9)
In the last year, has 
reported issue to…
Payam 
Administrator
Payam Chief Boma 
Administrator
Boma Chief
logit logit Logit logit
General phone cover 12.05*** -18.97*** -0.112 12.03***
(0.974) (1.142) (0.677) (0.912)
Sporadic phone 
cover
5.441*** -27.09*** 0.679 6.541***
(0.906) (0.696) (0.481) (0.695)
Constant -121.10 202.92 -2.011 -78.77
Observations 433 433 433 433
Pseudo-R2 
(McFadden)
0.1824 0.1735 0.1103 0.0459
PANEL C (10) (11)
Dissatisfaction 
with response of 
authority
Strong Strong or 
moderate
logit logit
General phone cover -19.01*** 14.20***
(1.020) (2.986)
Sporadic phone 
cover
-11.15*** 4.75***
(0.662) (1.670)
Indicator reporting 1.541*** 2.53***
(0.378) (0.338)
Constant 98.42 -62.467
Observations 433 433
Pseudo-R2 
(McFadden)
0.2125 0.2797
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people in areas with coverage express specific 
grievances against the national government 
and local political and administrative leaders. 
In areas without coverage there is a sense that 
the government actively seeks to harm people 
in the area.
ICTs and improved access to information 
can have unexpected effects in areas where 
democratic accountability structures are 
lacking. Increased access to information does 
not necessarily imply greater voter participa-
tion, especially when people have had nega-
tive experiences with the voting process. We 
cannot draw definitive conclusions about the 
impact of mobile phones on statebuilding 
and peacebuilding, but our results could sug-
gest that mobile phones contribute positively 
by increasing trust (or rather, decreasing out-
right mistrust) in government and local polit-
ical and administrative figures. However, we 
also see that mobile phone coverage may be 
related to increased demands on these local 
figures, demands that they seem unable to 
fulfill to people’s satisfaction—as in the case 
with the county commissioner who simply 
hung up on the payam chief who had called 
needing help with a security threat. For the 
chief, the fact that he had a communication 
device and access to a government admin-
istrator did not at all help him with his real 
problem. What we see from this research 
is that the assumption that merely having 
a communication device will lead to better 
communication and accountability is both 
a practical as well as a policy problem. The 
two problems overlap where the practical 
disappointment with government leadership 
turns into long-term alienation, which is 
unlikely to contribute positively to creating 
peace and building a state. 
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 25 boma K. 2013 Author 1 interview with 
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 26 boma M. 2013 Author 1 interview.13 May. 
 27 boma M. 2013 Author 1 group discussion. 
2 May. 
 28 boma K. 2013 Author 1 interview. 14 May.
 29 boma M. 2013 Author 1 interview 
Paramount Chief. 11 May. 
 30 boma D. 2013 Author 1 interview D. 11 
May.
 31 boma L. 2013 Author 1 interview. 30 
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 32 boma M. 2013 Author 1 group discussion. 
13 May. 
 33 boma L. 2013 Author 1 interview. 1 May.
 34 boma M. 2013 Author 1 interview govern-
ment executive. 10 May. 
 35 boma L. 2013 Author 1 interview with 
senior spiritual leader. 1 May. 
 36 boma K. 2013 Author 1 interview. 14 May. 
 37 boma L. 2013 Author 1 interview. 1 May.
 38 boma M. 2013 Author 1 interview.13 May
 39 boma C. 2013 Author 1 interview. 20 May.
 40 boma C. 2013 Author 1 group discussion. 
20 May
 41 boma C. 2013 Author 1 interview. 20 
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 42 boma C. 2013 Author 1 interview. 20 
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Arrow Boys. 23 May
 46 boma H. 2013 Author 1 discussion with 
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 49 boma H. 2013 Author 1 group discussion. 
23 May. 
 50 boma H. 2013 Author 1 discussion with 
Arrow Boys. 23 May
 51 boma H. 2013 Author 1 discussion with 
Arrow Boys. 23 May
 52 boma H. 2013 Author 1 discussion with 
Arrow Boys. 23 May
 53 boma D. 2013 Author 1 interview D, 11 
May.
References
Abraham, R 2006 Mobile Phones and Eco-
nomic Development. Evidence from the 
Fishing Industry in India. International 
Conference on Information and Communi-
cation Technology. Berkeley, CA: IEEE.
Aker, J C 2010 Information from Markets 
Near and Far: Mobile Phones and Agri-
cultural Markets in Niger. American Eco-
nomic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(3): 
46–59.
Aker, J C, Collier, P and Vicente, P C 2013 Is 
Information Power? Using Mobile Phones 
and Free Newspapers during an Election 
in Mozambique. Working paper.
Alozie, N O, Akpan-Obong, P and Foster, 
W A 2011 Sizing up information and 
communication technologies as agents 
of political development in sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Telecommunications Policy, 
35(8): 752–763. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.telpol.2011.07.001
Alzouma, G Forthcoming ‘The opportunity 
exists. Why don’t they seize it?’ Political 
(In)Competence and the Potential of ICTs 
for Good Governance in Niger Republic. 
Stability: International Journal of Security 
and Development.
Asiedu, C 2012 Information communica-
tion technologies for gender and devel-
opment in Africa: The case for radio and 
technological blending. International 
Communication Gazette, 74(3): 240–
257. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/ 
1748048511432606
Atkinson, R R 2009 Revisiting ‘Operation 
Lightning Thunder’. The Independent. 
Kampala.
Bailard, C S 2009 Mobile Phone Diffusion and 
Corruption in Africa. Political Communica-
tion, 26(3): 333-353. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1080/10584600903053684
Schomerus and Rigterink: ‘And Then He Switched off the Phone’Art. 10, page 22 of 23
Bhalla, J 2011 The Cans and Can’ts of Tech-
nology. http://www.africaresearchinsti-
tute.org/blog/technology-in-africa-1/.
Bos, K V D, Wilke, H a M and Lind, E A 
1998 When do we need procedural fair-
ness? The role of trust in authority. Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
75(6): 1449-1458.
Buys, P, Dasgupta, S and Thomas, T S 2009 
Determinants of a Digital Divide in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Spatial Econometric 
Analysis of Cell Phone Coverage. World 
Development, 37(9): 1494-1505. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev. 
2009.01.011
Campbell, S W and Kwak, N 2010 Mobile 
Communication and Civil Life: Linking 
Patterns of Use to Civic and Political 
Engagement. Journal of Communication, 
60(3): 536-555. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.1111/j.1460-2466.2010.01496.x
Cremer, D D and Tyler, T R 2007 The Effects 
of Trust in Authority and Procedural Fair-
ness on Cooperation. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 2(3): 639-649. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.3.639
Croke, K, Dabalen, A, Demombynes, G, 
Giugale, M and Hoogeveen, J 2013 
Collecting High-Frequency Data Using 
Mobile Phones : Do Timely Data Lead to 
Accountability? Economic Premise. The 
World Bank.
d’Errico, M, Kozlowska, K and Maxwell, 
D 2014 Surveying Livelihoods, Service 
Delivery and Governance: Baseline Evi-
dence from South Sudan In: CONSOR-
TIUM, T. S. L. R. Working Papers.
Demombynes, G, Gubbins, P and Romeo, 
A 2013 Challenges and Opportunities of 
Mobile Phone-Based Data Collection: Evi-
dence from South Sudan. Policy Research 
Working Paper. The World Bank.
Feddersen, T J and Pesendorfer, W 1996 
The Swing Voter’s Curse. American Eco-
nomic Review, 86(3): 408-424.
Gordon, S, Vandewint, C and Lehmeier, S 
2007 Reluctant Hosts: The Impact of the 
Lord’s Resistance Army on Communities 
in Western Equatoria State, Southern 
Sudan. World Vision.
Hermanns, H 2008 Mobile Democracy: 
Mobile Phones as Democratic Tools. 
Politics, 28(2): 74-82. DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2008.00314.x
Jacob, U-U J and Akpan, I Forthcoming 
Silencing Boko Haram: Mobile Phone 
Blackout and Counterinsurgency in Nige-
ria’s Northeast Region. Stability: Interna-
tional Journal of Security and Development.
Jensen, R 2007 The digitial provide: infor-
mation (technology), market perfor-
mance, and welfare in the south Indian 
fisheries sector. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 72(3): 879-924. DOI: http://
dx.doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.3.879
Jok, J M 2012 Insecurity and Ethnic Violence 
in South Sudan: Existential Threats to the 
State? Working Paper. The Sudd Institute.
Jok, J M 2014 South Sudan and the Prospects 
for Peace Amidst Violent Political Wran-
gling. Policy Brief. The Sudd Institute.
Lacher, W 2012 South Sudan: International 
State-Building and its Limits. Berlin: SWP.
Matsusaka, J G 1995 Explaining voter turn-
out patterns: An information theory. Pub-
lic Choice, 8491-117.
Pande, R 2011 Can Informed Voters Enforce 
Better Governance? Experiments in Low-
Income Democracies. Annual Review of 
Economics, 3215–37.
Rigterink, A S, Kenyi, J J and Schomerus, 
M 2014 Report of the Justice and Security 
Research Programme Survey in Western 
Equatoria State, South Sudan (first round 
May 2013). London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science.
Rotberg, R I and Aker, J C 2013 Mobile 
Phones: Uplifting Weak and Failed States. 
The Washington Quarterly, 36(1): 111-
125. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/016
3660X.2013.751651
Schomerus, M 2007 The Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Sudan: A History and Overview 
(Working Paper 8). Human Security Base-
line Assessment. Geneva: The Small Arms 
Survey.
Schomerus and Rigterink: ‘And Then He Switched off the Phone’ Art. 10, page 23 of 23
Schomerus, M 2012 They Forget What They 
Came For: Uganda’s Army in Sudan. Jour-
nal of Eastern African Studies, 6(1): 124-
153. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/175
31055.2012.664707
Schomerus, M 2014 Policy of Government 
and Policy of Culture: Understanding the 
Rules of Law in the ‘Context’ of South 
Sudan’s Western Equatoria State. In: 
MARSHALL, D. and ROSENBAUM, M. The 
International Rule of Law Movement: A 
Crisis of Legitimacy and the Way Forward. 
Cambridge: Harvard Law School Human 
Rights Programme/ Harvard University 
Press.
Schomerus, M and Allen, T 2010 Southern 
Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of 
conflict and predicaments of peace. Lon-
don: LSE/ DESTIN/ Pact Sudan/ DfID.
Schomerus, M and De Vries, L 2014 Impro-
vising border security: ‘A Situation of 
Security Pluralism’ along South Sudan’s 
Borders with the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Security Dialogue, 45(3 (Special 
Issue Governance of Border Security in 
Practice)): 
Schomerus, M and Tumutegyereize, K 
2009 After Operation Lightning Thunder: 
Protecting communities and building 
peace. London: Conciliation Resources.
Sobbrio, F Forthcoming The Political Econ-
omy of News Media: Theory, Evidence and 
Open Issues. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Press.
Wasserman, H 2011 Mobile Phones, Popu-
lar Media, and Everyday African Democ-
racy: Transmissions and Transgressions. 
Popular Communication, 9146–158.
Willis, J 2011 Sudan’s Elections: Voting 
for Authoritarians. Africa Review, 3(1): 
47–63.
Young, J 2012 The Fate of Sudan: The Origins 
and Consequences of a Flawed Peace Pro-
cess. London: Zed Books.
How to cite this article: Schomerus, M and Rigterink, A S 2015 ‘And Then He Switched off the 
Phone’: Mobile Phones, Participation and Political Accountability in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria 
State. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 10, pp. 1-23, DOI: http://dx.doi.
org/10.5334/sta.ew
Published: 09 March 2015
Copyright: © 2015 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (CC-BY 3.0), which permits unrestricted use, 
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. 
See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
 
 Stability: International Journal of Security & Development is a 
peer-reviewed open access journal published by Ubiquity Press
OPEN ACCESS
